data set, which covers the period between 1945 and 1999. Novel features of this new data set are: the recoding of the overlap period; a broader range of categories of intervention, including UN and non-UN missions; and wider temporal scope, by extending the period of analysis to 2010, by lowering the civil war threshold to 25 battle deaths, and by starting the conflict period from the date of the first battle death in each civil war (based on UCDP GED version-1.5-2011). The advantages of the data set are illustrated with an analysis of the different effects interventions have on high-and low-intensity conflict periods.
instance, it can allow us to understand how different combinations of bilateral and multilateral interventions affect conflict. It may be that the effects of multilateral interventions are influenced by bilateral initiatives and vice versa. By using a conflict-month unit of observation, the data set is disaggregated so as to capture relevant escalatory and de-escalatory effects resulting from the initiation of each specific intervention, while it is suitable to do more aggregated analysis with the conflict-year unit of observation commonly used to access the effect of interventions on conflict duration. The effects of specific interventions may differ according to whether the conflict is at a stage of high or low intensity. For instance, a military intervention in a low-intensity conflict may have a stronger escalatory effect on conflict intensity than in a high-intensity conflict, where it has a smaller marginal effect on the military capacities of the parties. By considering the conflict period as a whole (from the first to the last event with battle deaths), an analysis can be made of the effects of interventions in low-or no-intensity periods, even when these periods occur between periods of high-intensity conflict.
In the next section, I identify the main characteristics of the data set in a comparison with a set of alternative data sets. I then present in more detail the methodology and descriptive information of the new data set. The article concludes with the application of the data set to the investigation of the different effects of interventions in low-and high-intensity conflict.
EXISTING DATA SOURCES
Existing research looking into external interventions in civil wars has focused mainly on separate analyses of military, diplomatic, or peacekeeping interventions. There are only two data sets that analyze them all together. (See Table 1 for a comparison of data sets.)
The dimensions most commonly analyzed are foreign military interventions that overtly involve troops on the ground, as these are traditionally considered to have the direst of legal and conflict consequences. Such is the case for the Military Intervention Data (OMID) by Tillema (1989) and the International Military Intervention Dataset (IMI) by Pearson and Baumann, updated by Kisangani and Pickering (2009) . The UCDP External Support data set by Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér (2011) codes military support provided in 10 separate categories: troops, access to territory, access to military/intelligence infrastructure, weapons, material/logistics, training/expertise, funding/economic support, intelligence material, other forms of support, and unknown types of support. Some data sets focus on civil war but also provide information regarding overt external troop involvement in the conflict dyad. These include the Correlates of War (COW) (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) ; the UCDP Armed Conflict (Themnér and Wallensteen 2012) , and the Harbom and Wallensteen (2005) data set (these data sets are not compared in Table 1 ). UCDP/PRIO definition of a civil war is a "contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" (Gleditsch et al. 2002) . Sambanis' (2000, 2006) definition of civil war involves several criteria but, in essence, it is similar to the one of UCDP/PRIO in that it refers to an incompatibility involving the state and organized group(s), with the use of armed force surpassing a threshold of battle deaths within a certain time period. c Regan et al. (2009) Separate initiatives have coded diplomatic intervention (more specifically, the subtype of mediation). Such is the case for the International Conflict Management (ICM) data set (Bercovitch 1999) , the Civil War Mediation (CWM) data set (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011) , and the UCDP Managing Intrastate Low-Intensity Conflict (MILC) data set (Melander, Möller, and Öberg 2009 ). 1 Economic interventions in the context of civil war, intended to affect the the balance of capabilities of the parties as defined for this data set, have not been objects of significant research. These interventions are different from the humanitarian and development aid types of assistance, which have been researched in depth in other studies.
The dynamics of peacekeeping interventions is a field of research in itself; data sets focus on the United Nations (UN) missions (for example, Doyle and Sambanis 2000) and sometimes include also non-UN missions (Fortna 2004; Mullenbach 2013; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2007) . This data set provides a new coding of UN and non-UN missions with details on the mandates of these missions.
The data set with the broadest coverage of types of interventions available at this moment is Regan et al.'s (2009) Third Party Intervention Data, a global data set that covers the period from 1944 to 1999. For conflicts where at least 200 battle deaths were recorded in a year, it codes military, economic, and diplomatic intervention types and typifies a series of subtypes of intervention. Regan et al. (2009) is a conflict-month data set that merges Regan (2002) , which deals with military and economic interventions, with a diplomatic interventions data set developed by Regan and Aydin (2006) . The data set in Regan (2002) contains 150 conflicts, of which 100 involved interventions, corresponding to a total of 13,048 conflict-months, of which 1,038 involved interventions. Regan and Aydin's (2006) data set has 13,243 conflict-months, involving 68 conflicts and 436 diplomatic interventions. These data sets include interventions that are partisan or neutral and provide detailed identification on the state and nonstate interveners.
The scope of types of intervention and the disaggregation to a conflictmonth unit of observation in the Regan et al. (2009) data set are the unique characteristics that were the reason for making it the initial reference for the current data set. Nevertheless, its limitations in terms of not covering more recent periods (the data set ends in 1999) and the absence of lower-intensity conflicts and conflicts with less than 200 battle deaths per year have been overcome in this new data set.
More recently, Regan and Meachum (2014) , looking at periods of political instability, developed a data set whose structure is similar to that of Regan et al. (2009) . These are periods in which a series of variables are used to identify countries as being at risk of civil war, in cases where the conflict did not reach the 1,000 battle deaths that is commonly used as the threshold for defining a case of civil war. This is similar to what is here referred to as low-intensity conflict. Regan and Meachum's (2014) data set covers the world in the period between 1957 and 2007, with a total of 449 interventions coded, but for the overlap period and region with this data set (Africa between 1989 and 2007) they have coded fewer interventions than in this data set. For the overlap period and region, Regan and Meachum (2014) have 7,881 conflict-months with 130 interventions, while this data set has 4,347 conflict-months with a total of 406 interventions.
Specifically, the novel features of this data set versus Regan et al.'s (2009) are: the recoding of the period from 1989 to 1999 in order to ensure consistency of coding, resulting in an improvement in the number of interventions coded 2 ; the coding of a new period, from 1999 to 2010; the inclusion of subcategories of military and diplomatic sanctions, and UN and non-UN missions 3 ; the lowering of the death threshold for civil war from the 200 battle deaths of Regan et al. to the 25 of the UCDP/Peace Research Intitute Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict data set; the further extension of the scope of lowerintensity conflicts by starting conflict periods from the first event with a battle death; and the inclusion of events that occurred during inactive years, based on the UCDP GED, version 1.5 (Melander and Sundberg 2011). 4 Other main characteristics of the Regan et al. (2009) data set have been retained. A first characteristic is the conflict-month unit of observation. A second characteristic is the identification of the target of an intervention according to whether it is biased or neutral. A biased intervention occurs when the target of the intervention supports either the government or the opposition. A neutral intervention can be considered one if an intervention does not affect or is not intended to affect the balance of capabilities between the parties; these are normally undertaken to promote peace. A third characteristic is the recording of an entry in the data set for each intervention. As the 2 Improvements in data availability and search capabilities since 2000 (when the first data set on military and economic interventions was developed by Regan et al. [2009] ) means that more information on events has been made available in an accessible format. For Africa and the overlapping period of the two data sets (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) Högbladh at al. (2011) maintain that partisan and neutral interventions should be analyzed separately, and they identify different data sets for that purpose. They consider this to be a limitation of Regan et al.'s (2009) data set. Such a differentiation is made in other studies; for instance, in the specific data sets on peacekeeping, mediation, and military interventions like those presented in Table 1 . This article follows Regan et al.'s structure, as it allows, within a single data set, for analysis of each type of intervention while controlling for other types. 4 Inactive years are periods during which the threshold of 25 battle deaths in a year is not reached, with or without deadly events occurring throughout the year. Although UCDP GED includes the geographical positioning of conflict events, such information is not used because, at this stage, it is not possible to link interventions to subnational units across the spectrum of conflicts. information on the target of an intervention is a key dimension in the analysis of the theoretical framework used in several studies (Collier et al. 2004; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Regan et al. 2009 ), this data set is structured to provide details on it. However, coding the target for each intervention has the drawback that the data structure is not a pure time series, as n interventions in one month will produce n entries for that month. This data structure has implications for the statistical analysis, but an aggregation of interventions in the same month can be easily performed, although it means losing information in a key set of variables of intervention.
Overall this data set is more appropriate for use when the researchers are interested in controlling for the effect of one type of intervention versus other interventions, when they would like to analyze post-Cold War dynamics in Africa, when they need a disaggregation of the conflict-month unit of observation, when they require detailed characterisation of interventions, or when they need to link with other UCDP-compatible data sets.
THE DATA SET
The data set focuses on Africa, the region with both the largest number of civil wars and the largest number of external interventions-for instance, in the form of peacekeeping operations. Although external interventions data sets normally have a global coverage, there are other data initiatives that also focus on Africa. This is the case for the UCDP GED, which focuses solely on Africa, and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), which covers mainly African conflicts.
The data set is constructed with a conflict-month unit of observation, focusing on civil wars using the UCDP/PRIO definition of a "contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" (Gleditsch et al. 2002) . In Africa between 1989 and 2010, there were 42 conflicts in 30 countries that met these criteria. The date the conflict starts is the first "incidence of the use of armed force by an organized actor against another organized actor . . . resulting in at least one direct death in either the best, low, or high estimate categories . . . for a specific temporal duration" (Sundberg, Lindgren, and Padskocimaite 2010) . These two definitions correspond to 5,582 conflict-months, 1,845 of which involved deadly conflict. Because each intervention is coded independently, some months with more than one intervention have more than one entry in the data set, resulting in 5,788 data set entries. 5 External interventions have been added to this conflicts-months structure. The definition of external interventions is adapted from Regan et al. (2009) and Rosenau (1968) . I define external interventions as conventionbreaking political, economic, or military (including UN and non-UN missions) actions in a country targeting the country's authority structures (in support of the government, in opposition, or neutral) in order to influence the balance of power between the parties or the conflict process. The intervention is made by a third party foreign to the conflict country, and this third party can be a state or a nonstate actor. 6 Convention breaking refers to a significant and temporary change in the normal course of relations between the countries. A main qualification for the convention-breaking and exceptionality criteria are the characteristics of the intervention and the fact that interventions occur during a conflict.
In coding the external interventions, we observed an overall rule of identifying when they affect the balance of capabilities of the parties. This means that external interventions are coded with one entry in the month when they start for each unique combination of intervention type and target, although with the possibility of having more than one intervener. The target of an intervention can be in support of the government, the opposition, or neutral. 7 The original definition of Regan et al. (2009) is adapted in two ways. One is the explicit inclusion of both UN and non-UN missions, as they meet similar criteria for military or diplomatic interventions. It can easily be seen that an enforcement mission is similar to a bilateral or multilateral military intervention and that a political mission can have characteristics of theoretical bases and based on the validity and reliability of the UCDP data set and in particular that of the specific project of the UCDP GED extending the UCDP Armed Conflict information. Theoretically, the data set focuses on the intensity of a conflict and less on its onset. One argument for using a 25 battle deaths threshold to identify a conflict in the UCDP Armed Conflict data set is that this figure offers a threshold high enough to ensure that a conflict exists, taking into account possible errors when recording casualties. If this threshold were lower, for instance five or 10 battle deaths in a year, one could incur an error in identifying conflicts based on a number close to the possible reporting error. This data set respects this cautionary criterion. Only UCDP conflicts that reached 25 battle deaths are coded, but then for such conflicts the data set considers useful the data on the conflict events in the years leading up to or with less than 25 battle deaths. This means that the initiation of conflict can be coded on the date the first battle death occurs, broadening the scope of analysis, since this date may be different from the date on which the conflict reaches 25 battle deaths. Following the same logic, inactive years are also coded. These are years with less than 25 battle deaths after the conflict has reached 25 battle deaths. See Hoglund and Oberg (2011), who document the UCDP experience and procedures. 6 A list of state and nonstate actors is provided in the code book. Nonstate actors are multilateral organizations, specific multilateral groups, or international nongovernmental organizations. Support by other nonstate actors such as refugees, diaspora groups, and foreign rebels are not considered. 7 If there is a change of government in a month when an intervention has started, two interventions are coded for the month in order to reflect the change in target (these cases are rare). The opposition groups are not differentiated in the coding. Also, new entries are coded when the same intervener uses other types of intervention in one month and when one type of intervention is recurrent in more than one month.
an ongoing mediation or forum. Nevertheless, in much of the literature there is an understanding that peacekeeping missions (which are the main types of these new missions being coded) occur during peacetime periods and thus fall outside of an analysis of interventions in civil war. This view is not supported by the facts, as within the conflict period there are 58 missions, 29 of which do not have an enforcement or political mandate. This high number can be attributed partly to the broadening of the conflict period. It also reflects the fact that even if peacekeeping is effective in sustaining peace-defined as not having more than 999 battle deaths (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2004 )-it may be less effective in ending the lowintensity conflict that this definition of conflict is intended to capture. The second adaptation was already implicitly made by Regan et al. and has to do with broadening the concept of interventions to also include political and neutral interventions.
In total there are 576 external interventions, including military, economic, and diplomatic ones, and both UN and non-UN missions. This corresponds to an average of 13.7 interventions initiated per conflict.
The collection of data on external interventions is based on the news search engine FACTIVA, which provides broad coverage of the top news sources on Africa. 8 All of the entries of Regan et al. (2009) for the period from 1989 to 1999 were double-checked. 9 Whenever doubts emerged, academic case studies were used. For five entries, due to the unavailability of data (news or academic case studies), the UCDP External Support Dataset was consulted, and it is the single reference for these entries. Because the cases of UN and non-UN missions are widely documented in official sources and academic publications, the coding information is based mainly on the Web sites and official documents of the United Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the African Union (AU), and the European Union (EU), alongside Heldt and Wallensteen (2007) , Mays (2011) , and the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database (SIPRI MPOD). The conflict-interventions entries coded were cross-checked with the Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) database of intrastate dispute information (http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/dadm-data-sets/). The data are further validated by six military attachés from six African embassies in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in December 2012. The interviewees were those who answered a request sent out to all embassies representative of countries in this data set. Coincidentialy, there was at least one interviewee from each African subregion, and all confirmed the conflict-interventions narratives with very few changes. 10 With the data set of Regan et al. (2009) , particular attention was paid to ensuring intercoder consistency, which is reflected in the high correlation and similar patterns and regression results for the overlapping conflict periods (see footnote 9 and the attachment on intercoder consistency for details).
The coded interventions have 1,639 references, with an average of 2.8 references per intervention. Fifty-eight percent of all the references come from news reports: Reuters News, BBC Monitoring, Agence France-Associated Presse, All Africa, Xinhua News Agency, Associated Press Newswires, the Financial Times; Dow Jones International News, BBC Timeline, Inter-press Services, The New York Times, The Guardian, The Times, The Independent-London, and several others with fewer than 10 references each. About 29% of the references are from academic data sets, namely: the UCDP Peace Agreement, Regan et al. (2009) , UCDP External Support, the Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM), and the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database. About 9% of references are from official sources, including the UN, the AU, the OAU, the EU, and NATO. The remaining 4% of the references are from academic case studies. 11 There is a predominance of Anglophone sources. 12 Table 2 resumes the main data structure.
The distributions of the conflicts per subregion are presented in Figure 1 . The subregions with the most conflicts are Eastern and Western Africa. 13 (161), with a specification as to whether it involved troops (62), naval forces (two), equipment or aid (48), intelligence advisors (22), air support (10), or military sanctions (17); 2. Economic type (52), with a specification as to whether it involved grants (23), loans (three), nonmilitary equipment or expertize (zero), credits (one), relief from past obligations (10), or economic sanctions (15). 3. Diplomatic type (305), with a specification as to whether it involved a case of mediation (248), international forum (24), arbitration (zero), recall of ambassadors (one), offers to mediate by third parties that were rejected (18), requests for diplomatic intervention by one of the warring parties that were rejected (eight), or political sanctions (6). The criteria used to determine whether an intervention is a peacekeeping operation or not are based on Heldt and Wallensteen (2007) . A peacekeeping operation consists of the deployment of military troops and/or military observers and/or civilian police in target states; and a mandate established for the purpose of separating the conflict parties, monitoring ceasefires, maintaining buffer zones, and taking responsibility for the security situation between formerly, potentially, or presently warring parties and being neutral toward the conflict parties but not necessarily impartial toward their behavior. The mandate is formalized in multilateral agreements, peace agreements, and resolutions of the UN or regional organizations. This covers all the possible mandates considered, with two exceptions: prevention or political operations and enforcement missions. These are also included, as they equally meet the definition of external intervention. For this reason the reference in this category is to a broader category of UN and non-UN missions, instead of peacekeeping.
Thirty-two UN missions and 26 non-UN missions are classified according to the mandate based on the definitions of Diehl (2008) , Doyle and Sambanis (2006) , and Heldt and Wallensteen (2007) (see Figure 4 ).
Missions classified as preventive or political operations are normally deployed prior to the outbreak of armed conflict. These can be factfinding or mediation missions (cases of UN mediation or peacemaking without, however, a follow-up peacekeeping mission). Also included under this heading are cases of UN political and peacebuilding missions run through the Department of Political Affairs (as opposed to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations) and which are sometimes also deployed after periods of high-intensity conflict. These are not normally considered peacekeeping missions and do not fit the definition stated earlier. Nevertheless, they constitute interventions that are similar to diplomatic ones and more permanent than typical ad hoc short-term negotiating teams. 15 15 Because the conflict threshold was lowered to 25 battle deaths in a year and the conflict period starts from the first event with a battle death, this data set covers periods of very-low-intensity conflict not considered in civil war data sets. Thus, there are cases of preventive intervention that would not have been identified had the higher 1,000 battle death threshold been used as in other studies.
Observer missions are the ones with a specific mandate of monitoring, reporting, or observing. These missions usually do not have a large military component (their personnel numbering in the hundreds) and have very limited rules of engagement (they are often unarmed missions).
Traditional peacekeeping operations are normally interposition missions and have one of the following mandates: to provide protection through interposition or the separation of conflict parties and maintenance of buffer zones, monitoring ceasefires, maintaining law and order, and disarming and demobilizing factions. These are normally lightly armed missions. If the only function is one of these, or even includes the provision of security and humanitarian assistance, it is considered a traditional peacekeeping operation.
Multidimensional operations have at least two additional mandates beyond the protection a traditional peacekeeping operation provides. These dimensions include electoral assistance/monitoring, humanitarian assistance, and the training of local police or the security sector. These missions normally have a substantial civilian component for performing these duties and can include transitional administration.
Enforcement missions are those in which the peace operation is authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter and/or that frequently involve large-scale combat operations against one or more of the parties. These missions are not based on consent, can be with or without transitional administration, and are deployed to create-rather than maintainpeace. 16 The target of the intervention is identified in terms of whether it is in support of the government (139), in opposition (60), or neutral (377) (see Table 3 ), and up to six parties are coded for each intervention. Most Table 4 ). This pattern is repeated in the breakdown by type of intervention, except for diplomatic interventions where African states are the top interveners, with Italy and France being the first non-African states, in sixth and seventh place respectively among the top 10. State missions are all by non-African states.
For nonstate interventions (see Table 5 ), the main intervener is the UN, representing about 33% of all interveners, and African-based organizations (about 51% of all interveners, with the AU, the Economic Cummunity of West African States-ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development-IGAD, Southern African Development Community-SADC, the Arab League, and the Great Lakes Regional Peace Initiative in the top 10). The fifth-mostrelevant intervener is the European Commission (EC), which accounts for about 7% of all interventions.
Military and economic interventions normally have the involvement of parties from outside the region. Most of these are interventions by the UN or EC, but diplomatic interventions have significant involvement from Africa-based organizations. The UN and EC comprise about three-quarters of all military interveners (38% and 36% respectively), with African-based interveners comprising one-tenth. The UN and EC are the main economic interveners (35% and 44% respectively). Diplomatic interventions are predominantly African (66% of all interveners), followed by the UN (22% of all interveners). In terms of UN and non-UN missions, most interventions have UN involvement (55% of all interveners), with a significant number of interventions having African organizations involvement (28% of all interveners), followed by the EC (11% of all interveners).
Overall, among both state and nonstate interveners, African actors comprise the majority of interveners in military and diplomatic initiatives, while economic interventions are mainly initiated with the involvement of interveners outside the region (France, United States, the UN, and EC), and missions mainly involve the UN. These criteria mean that some well-known interveners may not be listed because they are not top 10 in any of the types, as in the case of Nigeria.
Figures 5 and 6 summarize the annual battle death data count together with the number of interventions of each type. Based on the UCDP GED (v1.5) data set, the number of battle deaths per event is aggregated to the conflict-month in the data set (based on the date of termination of an event) and further aggregated to the conflict-year for these figures.
The lower number of battle deaths from the year 2000 onwards requires zooming in from that date onwards for a better visualization of the pattern.
At this level of aggregation and for all conflicts, a correlation can be drawn between the frequency of the number of battle deaths and the num- missions initiated and a similar temporal pattern, with a peak in 1993 followed by a decline up to the late 1990s when there was a resurgence, with a steady number of new missions established annually from 2002 onwards. Before continuing with an illustration of the novel uses of the data set, it is worth mentioning some of its limitations.
The main shortcoming of the data set is that it is limited to Africa since the end of the Cold War. While this does limit its use, resource constraints prevented a broader temporal and geographical coverage. However, Africa is the region with the highest number and frequency of both civil wars and interventions, and the post-Cold War period is the most relevant for studies of the dynamics of interventions in a contemporary age. For these reasons, even with these limitations, the data set has the potential to contribute to theory development and testing.
As mentioned before, the data set provides detailed information on external interventions, with a single entry for each intervention, even if two or more occurred in the same month. This allows for richer information on interventions, which are the focus of this data set. The downside is that in its current structure, the data set is not a panel data set; nevertheless, if necessary the data set could be easily transformed into a panel data set by aggregating the information on interventions by month.
Ideally, the interventions would be coded from the date of initiation to the date of termination. Unfortunately, information on the initiation of interventions, particularly of the nonmission type, is more abundant than that on when those interventions ended. The reason for this is that news reports are more consistent in providing information on when an event begins than when it ends. For this reason, the data set codes all interventions by the date of initiation and, whenever possible, identifies the date when the interventions ended. Also, information regarding the size of the interventions, being measured in terms of soldiers, equipment, days, or money, could not be gathered for all interventions. This means that interventions with different sizes have the same weight in the data set. These two limitations apply to all types of intervention except to the missions, for which such information is coded systematically. Finally, due to resource and information limitations, it was not possible to use the conflict dyad and differentiate which opposition group an intervention targeted.
DIFFERENT EFFECTS OF INTERVENTIONS IN HIGH-AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
One of the advantages of the data set is that it allows a differentiation of the effects that interventions have in periods of high-and low-conflict intensity and on conflict escalation and de-esclation. The latter effects have not been investigated in previous studies, which have focused instead on conflict duration. Previous research on high-intensity conflict (above 200 battle deaths) has found that military and economic interventions increase conflict duration (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000; Regan 2002) , while diplomatic interventions can facilitate the termination of civil wars (Regan et al. 2009 ).
Here duration is considered a proxy for intensity, as per the definition a conflict persists if it has a minimum threshold of battle deaths in a certain time period. Research on low-intensity conflict has found that military interventions increase the likelihood of a conflict reaching the level of civil war (by reaching the threshold of 1,000 battle deaths in a year), while economic and diplomatic interventions decrease its likelihood (Regan and Meachum 2014) .
Considering the theoretical underpinnings of these studies and applying them to the effects of external interventions on conflict intensity, it is possible to identify the following expected mechanisms for high-and low-intensity conflict.
It is generally expected that external interventions increase the capacity of the parties in a conflict. Military and economic interventions, which are normally partisan interventions, increase the fighting capacity of the parties and are expected to lead to an increase in conflict intensity. This effect is expected to be more significant in low-intensity periods, as additional capacity in high-intensity periods will make a smaller marginal contribution to the conflict parties' existing military capacity.
Diplomatic interventions, which are normally neutral interventions, increase the capacity of the parties to reach and sustain a political solution and are expected to lead to decreases in conflict intensity. This effect is expected to be relatively more significant in high-intensity periods than in low-intensity ones, as any success of diplomatic interventions will be felt in the de-escalation from higher levels of battle deaths.
These two mechanisms are tested with the following conflict intensity model:
Conflict intensity is the count of battle deaths in a conflict i in a month t. The external interventions I it have been operationalized, with an increasing effect during a period of 2 years after they have started. The rationale is that there is an absortive capacity of the parties to take advantage of the support provided by the interveners. External interventions have a value of 1 in the first year and of 2 in the second year (with the exception of the subtype of military air support, which has a value of 2 in the month when it occurs). A vector of w control variables C it relevant to either the conflict or the interventions is identified, and these are a categorical variable of the conflict intensity levels in the previous year, 17 the natural log of the population, the previous year's purchasing power parity adjusted GDP per capita, a proxy for the level of democracy in terms of the mode of executive selection, 18 whether or not there are natural resources in the form of oil or gas, and the natural log of overseas development assistance (ODA). The model also includes a conflict-specific time trend starting from the initiation of the conflict (d it month t ), country fixed effects (a i ), and a disturbance term (e it ).
The model is used in four regressions, presented in Table 6 . The first regression is for all conflict-months, using a zero inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model (column 1 and 2). 19 The second regression, using a zero 17 Zero for zero battle deaths, 1 for between one and 24 battle deaths, 2 for between 25 and 999 battle deaths, and 3 for above 999 battle deaths. 18 One-direct election; two-indirect election; and three-nonelective. 19 The ZINB is justified on the grounds that zero is the modal category of the outcome variable, with 3,808 entries out of a total of 5,787 entries (66%), and the variance of battle deaths is higher than its mean for all data, for each conflict, and for each country. The ZINB model deals with the excess zeros in the count of battle deaths in two parts. A negative binomial model predicts the count of the cases with no certain zero battle deaths (int_m), and a logit model deals with the excess zeros (inflate), where an outcome of 1 means zero battle deaths and zero means some positive number. This estimation reflects the situation where there are no battles in a month (the excess zeros in the logit model), and the situation where there are battles in a month, whether they result in battle deaths or not (the no certain zero battle deaths in the negative binomial model). inflated poisson (ZIP) 20 model, is for high-intensity conflict-months, which are the conflict-months that occur in years when there were 1,000 or more battle deaths (columns 3 and 4). The low-intensity conflict-months are those that occur in years where there are fewer than 1,000 battle deaths. These low-intensity conflict-months are analyzed with a ZINB separately, in terms of their occurring before (columns 7 and 8) or after (columns 5 and 6) the conflict reaches 1,000 battle deaths per year. The results of the base ZINB model using all data are in line with results by the other researchers identified previously (model number in parentheses). Military and economic interventions have a strong escalatory effect in both increasing the likelihood of higher battle deaths (1) and decreasing the chances of there being a month with zero battle deaths (2). Diplomatic interventions have a de-escalatory effect, in decreasing the likelihood of higher battle deaths (1). 21 The differentiation between high and low intensity provides a more nuanced account of the mechanisms.
Military interventions have an escalatory effect (1, 2), but this effect is only realized in periods of low-intensity conflict that occur after the conflict has reached high intensity-1,000 battle deaths (5). Military interventions in high-intensity periods have no significant escalatory effect in months with a propensity for battle deaths (3). At the same time, in both highand low-intensity periods, military interventions decrease the likelihood of a conflict having zero battle deaths (4, 6). This is not necessarily an escalatory effect, as it could instead mean the maintenance of a certain level of intensity. Suprisingly, military interventions have no effect in low-intensity periods prior to the conflict reaching 1,000 battle deaths (7, 8) . This could be explained by the idea that interveners do not commit themselves militarily to a conflict before it starts, but once it is ongoing, external parties assume the task of providing support to one or more of the parties in the conflict.
Economic interventions have an escalatory effect for all conflict periods (1, 2) but no distinctly significant effect in high-or low-intensity periods (3 to 6), with the exception of economic interventions in low-intensity periods prior to a conflict reaching 1,000 battle deaths (8). In this case, economic interventions increase the likelihood of there being a month with zero battle deaths. This could suggest that economic interventions in the early stages of a conflict delay the escalation of conflict.
Diplomatic interventions have suprising results. For all confict periods, diplomatic interventions decrease the intensity of conflict (1), and this effect is stronger for low-intensity periods after they have reached 1,000 battle deaths (5) than for high-intensity conflicts (3). Suprisingly, in low-intensity periods prior to a conflict reaching 1,000 battle deaths, diplomatic interventions have no significant effect in de-escalating the conflict (7), although they increase the likelihood of there being zero battles in a month (8). Also, diplomatic interventions in high-intensity periods contribute to a decreased likelihood of there being zero battle deaths (4). Overall, the expected stronger de-escalatory effect in periods of high intensity is not confirmed, even though diplomacy becomes more de-escalatory once a conflict has passed the 1,000 battle death threshold, particularly in low-intensity periods.
These suprising results indicate that diplomacy does not always have a de-escalatory effect, perhaps because it is driven by the agendas of external supporters (Cunningham 2010 ). Nevertheless, it may also be the case that the reverse causality in the relationship between external interventions and conflict intensity affects the results. We may wonder whether external interventions are a result of higher conflict intensity or higher conflict intensity is the result of external interventions. Although previous levels of conflict are controlled for in this model, there is a need for more elaborated analysis controlling for this endogeneity.
CONCLUSION
This article presents a new data set of external interventions that makes a contribution to the available data on external interventions in conflicts. It is the sole data set that covers the entire post-Cold War period in Africa and does so in terms of the most significant types of intervention: military, economic, diplomatic, and UN and non-UN missions. Also, it disaggregates interventions with information on intervention subtypes and mission mandates. Consequently, it allows us to analyze the effects of a specific type or subtype of intervention, while controlling for the effects of other interventions within a single data set and thus increasing the reliability of the analysis. Furthermore, the characterization of each intervention is extensive, covering intent, target, and interveners in terms of identification, location, and categorization, and with identification of the diplomatic outcome in the form of peace agreements.
In terms of the time dimension, by using the conflict-month unit of observation, our use of disaggregation enables us to account for the variations relevant to a study of external interventions with both high-and low-intensity levels of conflict. An illustration is provided of how the novel characteristics of the data set can be used to test and develop newer and more nuanced theoretical explanations of the effects of external interventions on conflicts.
